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A Brief History of the Tay Son Movement (1771-1802) by George Dutton (1998) (gdutton@u.washington.edu) This essay is designed as a cursory introduction to the Tay Son movement and its main phases. The focus on this essay is on broad military and political events during this period, with some description of economic and social factors that precipitated the uprising. This essay does not attempt to explore the very important, and to my mind, more interesting social and ideological ramifications of the Tay Son movement. It is thus far from complete, but I hope that it will serve as a useful starting point for understanding why the Tay Son period was such a significant one in Vietnam's long history. The sources for this essay can be found in the bibliographical pages I have posted elsewhere on this site. I have not included footnotes in this essay, to reduce clutter. However, I will gladly provide citations to those who are interested. I also welcome feedback on this essay and hope to improve it over time: gdutton@u.washington.edu * Background to the Tay Son: The Trinh-Nguyen Schism The story of the Tay Son must, in some ways, begin with the division of the country into northern and southern ruling houses. While this is often portrayed as a partition or division of Viet Nam, the reality is that prior to the Nguyen- led expansion to the south there had been no real Vietnamese political presence in that region. Thus, it is more precisely the case that the Nguyen opened up new territory, at the expense of the Chams and the Khmers, and used this new territory to challenge the authority of the Trinh ruling family in the north. The reason that there is some confusion on this point is the fact that the Nguyen continued to profess their allegiance to the Le Emperor, who remained the nominal political leader of the country. Since the Nguyen viewed themselves as officials of the Le dynasty, they did not portray themselves as a leaders of a separate entity. Despite their continuing allegiance, over time they gradually changed their titles and the words used to describe their officialdom and trappings of state so that by the latter part of the 18th century there was no doubt about their own sense of their political strength. As early as 1702 there were clear indications that the Nguyen were not content to view themselves as subordinates of the Le. In that year, Le Quy Don reports, in his Phu Bien Tap Luc, that the Nguyen lord sent a message and gifts to China (via Siamese middlemen) requesting that the Nguyen be granted political recognition. The Chinese, seeing an Emperor still on the throne in the north, refused to accept the Nguyen appeal and gifts. In any event, the confrontation between the Trinh, in the north, and the Nguyen in the south was a defining element of Vietnamese history from the middle of the 16th century to the end of the 18th. The division between the Trinh and Nguyen is further complicated, by the fact that the two families were related by marriage since the mid-16th century. It was in this period that both where fighting on behalf of the legitimate heir of the Le dynasty which was struggling for survival against the upstart Mac family. Nguyen Kim, the progenitor of the Nguyen family was a general who was defending the Le against the Mac, and he needed the assistance of Trinh Kiem, a gifted general, to support his campaign. To secure this assistance, Nguyen Kim gave his daughter to Kiem in marriage. The power balance between the two families shifted in xxx , when Kim was poisoned by a surrendering Mac general, and Trinh Kiem took command of the Le troops. As a result, the Trinh began to gain the political upper hand, Eventually they sought to impose a more direct political control and to extend their influence over the Le emperor. However, even without Nguyen Kim, the Nguyen family was still quite powerful through the prestige of his two sons, and could potentially jeopardize the Trinh aspirations. Consequently, a Trinh general killed one of Nguyen Kim's two sons in the mid-1550s, and the other son, Nguyen Hoang, fearing the same fate, arranged to be stationed in the south in Thuan Hoa. The Trinh were content to keep the Nguyen at a distance, where they could offer no challenge to Trinh political supremacy at the Le court. By 1566, Nguyen Hoang had become governor of Thuan Hoa and Quang Nam, with the provision that he remit annual tribute to the Le Emperor in the name of the Trinh.[Side Note: while the Nguyen-Trinh split thus dates from the 1550s, the Le-Mac conflict, which had broken out in 1527, continued until 1592, and in fact beyond that with Mac remnants continuing to pose a threat to the Trinh and their control over the Le dynasty.] The Trinh rule became more oppressive and while Nguyen Hoang came back for 8 years (1593-1600) to help the Le and Trinh put down a Mac challenge, he left again when he saw a series of revolts against the Trinh developing around the north. He left his daughter in marriage to a Trinh, and stationed his 6th son in Quang Nam, to divert the Trinh from realizing that he had no intention of returning to the north. War broke out under Nguyen Hoang's son Nguyen Phuc Nguyen, in 1627, when he refused a summons to return to the Le court. In all, seven major campaigns were fought between the two sides from 1627 to 1672, with both sides at one time invading the other. The battles were ultimately inconclusive, and finally, after the seventh conflict, it was agreed that the Linh-Gianh River would serve as a demarcation line between the two territories, with both sides continuing to claim their allegiance to the Le. This line was to hold until the Tay Son period, when the Trinh, taking advantage of the plight of the Nguyen invaded over the Linh-Gianh River. The main things to keep in mind are that by the beginning of the 18th century, Viet Nam - or more accurately Dai Viet as it was formally known at the time - was divided between two ruling families, the Trinh in the North, who controlled a puppet Emperor, and the Nguyen in the South who also claimed to be loyal supporters of the Imperial House. The line dividing their respective territories was at the Linh-Gianh River, which flows through Quang Binh province, north of Hue [check on this]. This sets the stage for the events of the 18th century, and the Tay Son rebellion in particular. * Economic and Political Turmoil in the Trinh North The 18th century was a period of almost continual upheaval and turmoil in both parts of Viet Nam, though perhaps more dramatically in the north. There the situation deteriorated dramatically during the second decade of the century, under the rule of Trinh Giang and his successors. His tyrannical reign and tolerance of corruption among officials led to a large number of rebellions in the north. In addition, the capital was in almost constant upheaval as various political factions emerged supporting various claimants to the titles of Chua and Emperor. There were numerous troop uprisings and military factions came to hold increasing power over political events. These political problems, however, were only the backdrop to more profound problems affecting northern society. The chief economic and social problems were related to land distribution, taxation and natural disasters. In the area of land distribution, the fundamental problem was that much Vietnamese farming was done on communal lands, controlled by the village. In Trinh territory by this time, much of the communal land had been seized by powerful officials and landholders who had established private estates of their own - leaving many villages with inadequate farm land. Efforts by the Trinh to protect communal land, and its periodic redistribution, were unsuccessful because the power of local or provincial-level officials was simply too strong. The second huge problem was an increasing tax burden falling on the northern Vietnamese population, designed to support the grandiose spending by the Trinh on new palaces, ceremonies, pagodas, etc. The distribution of the tax burden also became increasingly uneven as mandarins in the bureaucratic hierarchy were exempted from the land tax.Furthermore, a whole new tax structure was created to extract revenue from non-land sources - taxes on goods and services, including many everyday items such as salt and charcoal. As a consequence, many small artisans were forced out of business because the people could no longer afford to purchase their goods. Finally, in addition to these artificially constructed problems, the north was beset by a series of natural disasters that further compounded the difficulties facing the general populace. Famines struck large parts of the north in the 1730s and 1740s, causing widespread death and disease. In fact, court histories that describe these events talk of bodies lining many of the major roads in the north, and people turning to cannibalism to survive. Clearly the situation was catastrophic. All of these factors contributed to make life under the Trinh rather miserable; they also contributed to large-scale population movements with people leaving their local villages in search of food, land or shelter. As a consequence, the Trinh lost a great deal of control over their people. Political and economic control at this time was dependent on sedentary populations based in villages where records could be maintained, taxes could be collected and crops could be farmed. With large numbers of people on the road, the stage was set for turmoil. The Trinh repeatedly sought to lure people back to their villages and farms, but these efforts were also largely ineffectual. It was these wandering populations that served as the main source of supporters for the rebellions that were to break out in the North beginning in the 1730s, and were to remain a major problem for the Trinh up to the time of their final destruction by the Tay Son in the 1780s. In fact, they became almost a continuous feature of the landscape of Trinh territory throughout the century. Many of these rebellions were, in fact, not led by the displaced and starving peasantry, but rather by members of the Le royal family and high mandarins and scholars who had lost faith in the Trinh administration. The wandering peasants, though, became their followers and supporters. * Political and Economic Turmoil in the Nguyen South The situation in the south during the early and mid-18th century was somewhat better than that of the north, though many of the same problems were also plaguing the Nguyen territories. The tyranny of the new (since when?) regent of the Nguyen lords, Truong Phuc Loan, is routinely cited as the main reason for peasant unrest and displeasure with the government. Loan, who had served as an advisor to the 8th Nguyen ruler - Nguyen Phuc Khoat - had on the ruler's death, altered the imperial will, placing a young and manipulable prince (the 16th son of the ruler), on the throne instead of the designated heir. According to the Nguyen records, Loan then raised and extended taxes greatly increasing his own personal wealth and influence. His actions had raised the potential for a crisis of legitimacy, since there were people in the government who were aware of Loan's intrigues in displacing the legitimate heir. Just as important, many of the same problems that were troubling the Trinh populations were afflicting those living in Nguyen territory. There were questions about corruption within the government, the usurpation of public (village/communal) lands by government mandarins, as well as issues of starvation and poor harvests due to heavy taxation, and corruption compounded by weather conditions. The south had an additional economic problem contributing to the rice shortages and consequent starvation - the Nguyen use of zinc currency. Traditionally, the coins in circulation were of copper and this was a widely respected medium of exchange. However, in the 18th century, the Nguyen's overseas sources of copper had been cut off, and since they did not mine any of their own copper, they were forced to seek alternative metals. They chose to produce zinc coins. The Nguyen rulers then decreed that the zinc coins be accepted at parity with the copper ones. The population largely rejected this, however, preferring the more durable copper coins; in fact, the people made it clear that they would rather hoard rice than sell it for the zinc coins, and consequently prices for rice rose as the available supply shrunk, leading to the beginnings of famine. A retired Nguyen official submitted a memorial to the rulers pointing out this problem, and urging them to try to produce more copper coins and to establish warehouses of rice to help to stabilize rice prices, but his warnings were ignored, and ultimately, the records state, he joined the Tay Son instead. Despite the currency and other economic problem, the South was actually a very wealthy region at this time. The underlying problem during this period was thus, not a lack of wealth, but of its unequal distribution and the efforts of corrupt officials to extract wealth. Thus, some of the rebellions that developed in the south during this period occurred in particularly prosperous areas, which were naturally the most attractive places for corrupt officials seeking private gain. In fact, the Nguyen chronicles for the year 1769 record that the government collected taxes in rice of nearly 9.6 million thang (dry quarts) from a population of approximately 292,000 people. The Tay Son, however, concentrated on the unequal distribution issue, potraying themselves as champions of the oppressed. Consequently, when the uprising broke out, one of their first objectives was to see to a redistribution of this wealth, and they moved through the country with the slogan: "take from the wealthy, and give to the poor." * The Early Tay Son Period (1771- 1775) The Tay Son uprising itself began in 1771 in the south-central Vietnamese village by that same name. In that village lived three brothers, Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Hue and Nguyen Lu [A note of clarification on the surname Nguyen. The brothers' surname, Nguyen, is a potential source of confusion, because it is identical to that of the ruling southern lords. In fact, this surname is very common in Viet Nam, so it is not surprising that two families, even juxtaposed in this manner would both carry it. In the case of the Tay Son brothers, however, it was in fact borrowed from their mother's side of the family, in an effort to both legitimate and protect themselves in the course of the movement. (the logic being that the name gave them prestige and legitimacy in the minds of the peasants.)]. Although these three could be considered peasants, they were certainly well-off peasants, and had received a fair amount of education in the form of private tutoring. The eldest of the three, Nguyen Nhac, was a trader in betel nut who often traded with highland peoples in the regions west of the village of Tay Son. He was also a part-time tax collector for the Nguyen government. It was apparently his tax collecting job that got him into trouble with the Nguyen authorities. While the historical record is not clear on this point, the records suggest he either gambled with and lost the tax monies he had collected for the state, or embezzled the funds in some other form. It has also been speculated that he was simply unable to collect taxes from areas without resources to meet the state demands. Rather than waiting to be charged with a crime, Nhac fled to the hills accompanied by his two younger brothers. Given the large following that Nhac quickly gathered around him, it is clear that his was not a simple case of fraud, and that there were a variety of much larger issues at stake. As I mentioned earlier, there were a variety of factors that had made life for many southern Vietnamese peasants quite miserable. Thus, it is not surprising, in some sense, that Nhac was able to rally peasants to his side by calling for an end to the tyranny of Truong Phuc Loan and the restoration of the legitimate Nguyen heir. While most people probably had little idea of the political abilities of this heir, it was difficult to imagine a ruler worse than Loan, and the lure of a "legitimate" ruler was often appealing. The bigger question about the early Tay Son success in gaining so many supporters is what factors made the Tay Son brothers so appealing as leaders in this crusade. The answer seems to be that the Tay Son brothers were very successful in portraying themselves as divinely ordained to carry out this task. The Tay Son brothers were acutely aware that their ability to attract peasant followers would be directly related to their ability to demonstrate that "heaven" or supernatural forces were on their side. Thus they tried to demonstrate that their rebellion was sanctioned by supernatural forces or had been foretold by various signs or prophecies. For example, according to their tutor, Giao Hien, Nguyen Nhac was the fulfillment of an old prophecy which ran: "in the west there is a righteous rebellion, and in the north merit is received" Hien observed to Nhac,: &laqno;You are a person from Tay Son (that is, the Western mountains), thus you must strive to rise (in power).» A number of oral traditions about the brothers reflect some of the ways in which they tried to gain followers in this manner. One, describing the unifying power of the Tay-son, tells of Nguyen Nhac's finding the blade of a precious sword in the coastal plains and then finding its matching handle in the highland area. A similar account describes his finding a sword in the plains, and a golden seal in the highlands. In addition, Nguyen Hue was said to possess super-human strength which allowed him to wield a silver lance which could not be lifted by ordinary men, and to uproot small trees with his bare hands. Numerous stories about the Tay-son brothers have been preserved in their native area and give an indication of the supernatural aura which grew up around the rebel leaders and which convinced many rural people to join their movement. One account tells of a pair of giant snakes blocking a road along which Nguyen Hue was leading his troops. His troops were terrified, but Nguyen Hue dismounted from his horse, and prayed to the snake spirit saying: "If my brothers and I are able to undertake this great task then I request the Snake spirit to clear off of the road to allow my soldiers to pass. If it is my fate that this cannot come to pass, then please just bite me to death but allow my troops to live and to return to their children and wives." Thereupon the snakes cleared the path and escorted the troops to their destination. They further aided the Tay-son by bringing to Nguyen Hue in their mouths "a dragon knife, its handle black like ebony, its blade sharp like water." The dragon knife is symbolic of a king and the knife carried to the brothers is reminiscent of the sword brought to Le Loi by the tortoise in the Lake of the Restored Sword for him to use in defeating the Ming in the 15th century. That the Tay-son brothers were aware of the value of supernatural sanction is revealed in another tale which describes NguyenNhac's taking advantage of superstitions surrounding a local mountain peak. He surreptitiously smuggled some drums and gongs up the hill and on the night of a local festival arranged for them to be secretly sounded and accompanied by flashing lights. To the amazement of his guests, he gathered a group of adventurous locals and climbed the hill to encounter a wizened old man who summoned Nguyen Nhac by name to hear an edict which read "the Jade Emperor orders Nguyen Nhac to serve as the country's Emperor." After reading it, he handed the "divine" edict to Nguyen Nhac and vanished into the night. The old man was in fact Nguyen Nhac's teacher who advised him in arranging this stunt. The local people were not always swayed by such trickery. Another story records that while many tribal groups in the Tay-son area were willing to support the brothers, a certain group from Xa-Dang was reluctant to go along. The Xa Dang people were not convinced that the Tay Son had the will of heaven on their side. Nguyen Nhac tried to convince them by making a show of carrying water from a local stream in a pair of loosely woven straw baskets. He hoped to show his divine calling through the apparent miracle of water not leaking out of the baskets, which he had cleverly coated with a transparent oil. The village leader was not impressed, stating that this was the result of a magical spell (ie. of terrestrial origin) rather than any indication of heaven's preference. The Xa Dang people suggested that if Nguyen Nhac was really chosen by heaven, then he could perform a feat of their own devising. It happened that the mountain region contained a tribe of wild horses which were impossible to approach because they fled at the mere sight of a human shadow. The Xa Dang told Nguyen Nhac that if he were able to call the horses to come to him then they would consider this a divine manifestation. Nguyen Nhac accepted the challenge and promptly went out to purchase a young and attractive female horse which he trained to come whenever he called to it. Once it had been well- trained, be released it to run with the wild horses. At first suspicious of the newcomer, the wild horses were soon won over by the attractive female. Nguyen Nhac then called to his horse and she came running with the wild herd close behind. On seeing Nguyen Nhac they hesitated, but when they saw the grass he held and the trust that their new companion had in him, they slowly approached. Nhac then performed this demonstration for the people of Xa Dang, calling the wild forest horses to him. This indication of his "control" over nature convinced them that he did have the support of heaven and many of them agreed to support his movement. The portents of the Tay Son are not restricted to their own accounts. The Nguyen chronicles, albeit after the fact, also record numerous indications of the coming rebellion. In 1769, a court official observes a comet moving across the sky, and interprets it as meaning that there will be a rebellion in the central region in 6 years (1775). Later that year, the record notes that "there appeared frequent strange signs: the earth moved, the mountains crumbled, the stars fell, the water turned red, the people suffered famine and bandits were everywhere. Throughout the land were seen these many spontaneous occurrences." Clearly, these records suggest, there were problems surrounding the southern government controlled by Truong Phuoc Loan and that the future held great upheavals. So, now back to the story. Having decided to avoid prosecution by the Nguyen authorities, the Tay Son brothers had withdrawn to the An Khe region in the highlands to the west of Tay Son. The remained in this area for the next three years working to consolidate their base and attract followers to their armed uprising. An Khe had several strategic advantages for the Tay Son. It was in a relatively remote area, almost inaccessible to the Nguyen troops for it was approachable only along a treacherous route which was easily defensible. Furthermore, because of his trading routes in this area, Nguyen Nhac already had numerous contacts and was familiar with the region and its people. The strength of their position allowed the Tay Son to win some early victories which enhanced their prestige and attracted further followers. In addition, An Khe was a resource-rich area that supplied the Tay Son with wood, iron, sulphur, horses and elephants as well as people. In fact, the Tay Son movement is unusual in its heavy reliance on support from highland peoples who were usually not involved in Vietnamese wars, which generally involved only the lowland Vietnamese. These early years also served to earn the rebels a widely spread reputation as honorable fighters who went out of their way to avoid alienating the peasant majority of the population. A Spanish missionary, Father Diego de Jumilla noted, in a letter written in 1774, that the rebel troops: "did no harm to either persons or property. On the contrary, they appeared to desire equality for all Cochin-Chinese; they entered the houses of the rich and, if they were offered some present, they did no damage. But if they met resistance, they seized the most luxurious articles, which they distributed among the poor, keeping for themselves only rice and victuals...they were called virtuous thieves, and they were said to be charitable towards the poor plebeians..." The Tay Son did not only gain support from peasants, however, for they were also able to appeal to other classes of society which see a need to replace the corrupt regent. By 1773, the ranks of their supporters included a Cham princess, and 2 wealthy merchants from Qui Nhon, Nguyen Thung and Huyen Khe, who provided both cash and supplies to the troops. A short while later, two wealthy Chinese businessmen, Ly Tai and Tap Dinh, also joined the Tay Son. Others who joined the movement included Buddhist monks, progressive scholars and low-ranking officials and small merchants who had all come to regard the Tay Son as a possible solution to the ills of their society and economy. After three years in An Khe, the Tay Son began to increase the scope of their military activity and also revealed some of their strategic brilliance and general characteristics that were to distinguish their armies. They made their debut in the lowland coastal region in dramatic fashion in 1774. In that year, Nhac faked his own capture and had himself delivered to the coastal walled city of Qui Nhon in a cage. That night, he freed himself from the cage, and opened the gates of the city to the Tay Son troops. They immediately entered and overran the city, killing most of the garrison troops. As a result, the Tay Son controlled a key coastal city that was to continue to serve as one of their most important bases, and remained in their hands throughout the period of the rebellion. After the capture of Qui Nhon, the Tay Son armies moved quickly. The Nguyen troops had been at peace for a long period of time, and were no longer used to the rigors of battle - many simply ran away when confronted by the Tay Son, and the Nguyen court routinely had to force soldiers back to the battlefields. Also, as the Tay Son forces marched across the South, they demonstrated some of their distinctive features. They fought under a huge red banner carried at the front of their ranks. They made a loud hissing sound as they travelled to strike fear into the hearts of the Nguyen troops, and they came to be referred to as a "hissing army." [The Nguyen armies would employ a variant of this tactic later in their fight against the Tay Son - they attached a corps of female singers to each military unit and they would sing as the troops marched around the countryside and into battle - both to encourge their own troops, and to distract the enemy forces.] The Tay Son also became known for their use of strategic ruses to intimidate and confuse their enemies. The cage episode is just one example of their creative military tactics. In another major battle, they used some of their highland troops and disguised them as Chinese, cutting their hair to leave only a pigtail, and making them drink heavily before the battle to make them more fearless. In addition, these troops actually carried pieces of gold or silver foil on the field of battle so they could check to see if enemies lying on the ground were still alive, and could kill them if they were still breathing. The Nguyen records state that "no one among the king's forces could resist them." In addition, the course of the Tay Son military campaigns was full of the use of strategic withdrawals that would lure enemy troops into Tay Son ambushes both in land and often river battles. * The Trinh Invasion and the Tay Son Response Thus by 1774 the Tay Son forces had the Nguyen clearly on the defensive when suddenly they encountered a new problem. The Trinh government in the north had been following developments South and saw that the Nguyen government was fighting for its very survival. Naturally the Trinh saw this as a golden opportunity. They quickly assembled an army of 30,000 troops and moved southward. They soon crossed the Gianh River, the traditional Trinh-Nguyen border, and then breached the strategic Dong-hoi Wall, which the Nguyen had constructed precisely against such a Trinh invasion, without a fight. As the Trinh had calculated, there was no resistance because the Nguyen were too busy with the Tay Son, and in any case, the inhabitants of Thuan Hoa were suffering from famine and thus were far too weak to resist the Trinh invaders. The Trinh invaders quickly approached the Nguyen capital at Phu Xuan (present day Hue) where the court was in total disarray and readily acceded to the Trinh demand that Truong Phuc Loan, the regent, be handed over to them. This did not stop the Trinh advanced and they seized Phu Xuan in 1775. This presented the Tay Son with a difficult choice. Just as the Trinh were pressing at Tay Son positions in the northern part of the region, they were being pushed from the South by the Nguyen armies which had retaken Binh-Thuan and then Phu Yen in a counteroffensive that was moving northward. The Tay Son decided to reach a strategic accomodation with the Trinh, sending them gifts of gold and silk and offering to join them in their assault on the advancing Nguyen forces. The Trinh readily agreed to this offer and bestowed official military titles and positions on the Tay Son leaders and troops and sent them off to fight the Nguyen. The Trinh agreed to this arrangement for a number of reasons, all guided by pragmatism. Their forces were quite distant from their home bases, and thus their supply lines were quite tenuous. Furthermore, they were completely unfamiliar with the terrain to the South of Phu Xuan. Finally, they felt that they had little to lose by settling into a fortified Phu Xuan and watching the Tay Son fight the Nguyen on their behalf. * The Battles for the South (1775-1785) The next 10 years were marked by a seemingly endless series of battles between the Tay Son and the Nguyen forces to capture and recapture the province of Gia Dinh and its strategic capital of Saigon. The Tay Son forces successfully captured the city for the first time in 1776 as the youngest, and least capable brother, Nguyen Lu, led a major naval attack up the Saigon river. Shortly thereafter, the Nguyen forces returned, recaptured the city and force Lu to retreat to Qui Nhon. This set the stage for the next nine years. In 1777, Nhac sent Lu and Hue to recapture Saigon. Nguyen Hue went south at the head of a land and sea army that in 6 months destroyed the majority of the Nguyen armed forces and killed nearly every member of the Nguyen royal family. Having completed his task, Hue returned to Qui Nhon, leaving a body of troops behind to retain control of the city. The following year, 1778, there were further developments in the north where Nguyen Nhac remained settled at Qui Nhon. Confident that he was in complete control of the South, Nhac proclaimed himself king at Cha Ban, the ancient Cham capital. He felt fairly certain that he could take this step without interference from the Trinh, because their forces in the south were ravaged by disease and they had been forced to retreat back over the Hai Van pass and into Phu Xuan, from where they could do little to interfere with Tay Son actions. Meanwhile, back in the south, one member of the Nguyen royal family, Nguyen Anh, had survived the Tay Son's massacre and escaped from Gia Dinh, spending a long time in the swamps of Ca Mau (at the southern tip of Viet Nam), before finding refuge on Pulau Panjang in the gulf of Siam. On news of the Tay Son departure from Gia Dinh, he regrouped his remaining forces and advanced via Long Xuyen and Sa Dec to reenter Gia Dinh in triumph. A small Tay Son reinforcement force was destroyed by the Nguyen and they advanced north into Binh Thuan. Having recovered Gia Dinh, the remaining Nguyen prince sought to extend recognition of his questionable authority. He sent an embassy to Siam hoping to reach agreement on a treaty of friendship, which would help to bolster his legitimacy in preparation for a campaign to retake the country from the Tay Son. In terms of domestic affairs, he organized three provinces in the lands that he controlled: Tran Bien, Phien Tran and Lang Ho. He also named political officials, levied taxes, trained armies and a navy and encouraged a program of land redistribution to promote agriculture in region that had now been ravaged by several years of fighting. Finally, in 1780, he formally proclaimed himself as the new Nguyen ruler. In May 1782, the Tay Son were ready to retake the southern city. Nhac and Hue, at the head of 100 warships, forced their way up the Saigon River and raised an assault on the citadel. When they finally fought their way into the city, their forces burned and pillaged the shops of the Chinese merchants and massacred 10,000 Chinese. The exact reason for this massacre is unclear. According to the Nguyen records , one of Nguyen Nhac's closest aides had been killed by Nguyen troops who happened to be ethnic Chinese. In revenge, Nhac ordered the killing of ethnic Chinese in the city including women and children. Others have argued that this act was taken to destroy the ethnic Chinese commercial monopoly. After this savage victory, the Tay Son leaders once more return north, leaving the city in the hands of their trusted troops. And, hearing that Hue and Nhac have left, Nguyen Anh once again retook Saigon. By now the pattern should be very clear and perhaps raises the question why this pattern did in fact develop. There are probably two major reasons. The first is that the rhythm of the campaigns was dictated in part by the changing monsoon winds. Since the armies coming from Qui Nhon were often carried on boats, they had to wait for the winds to carry them southward. Then, if they wanted to return north, they had to depart while the winds were favorable for sailing in that direction. And why did the Tay Son brothers repeately abandon the area of Gia Dinh, leaving their underlings in charge? Keith Taylor has speculated that the Tay Son never got beyond a somewhat provincial outlook that meant that regardless of how far they would move their troops to achieve some military objective, they were always most comfortable in their original base and heartland around Qui Nhon. This was true in the campaigns of the 1770s and early 1780s, and again in the mid-1780s, when the Tay Son troops headed into Trinh territory. Then, in March 1783, Hue and Lu returned once again, and once more destroyed the Nguyen Army, forcing Nguyen Anh to flee to Phu Quoc island, where his men are reduced to eating grasses and bananas. This battle again revealed the tactical genius of the Tay Son leader, Nguyen Hue. He took advantage of the flood tide and its high winds to launch his attack on Saigon. The flaming arrows of the Nguyen forces, shot into the wind blew back onto their own forces, while the arrows of the Tay Son easily and quickly flew to hit their targets. In addition, Nguyen Hue gained a further psychological advantage by using war elephants in a region that had rarely seen such beasts. He had developed a means of transporting the elephants in the swampy riverine areas of the southern delta, overcome a difficulting that had previously prevented the use of elephants in that region. The Nguyen were quickly demoralized and destroyed. A Tay Son fleet chased Nguyen Anh, but was lost in a great storm, and Nguyen Anh was able to escape and flees to Siam where he was given shelter by the Siamese king. Two years later, in 1785, Nguyen Anh, made another effort to retake Saigon. Backed by 20,000 Siamese soldiers and 300 ships the Nguyen forces moved by foot across Cambodia and by sea through the gulf of Siam in an attack on the southern Vietnamese provinces. The Tay Son were once again ready for the Nguyen attack. The subsequent military encounter was to rank as one of the great triumphs of Vietnamese military history. The Tay Son leader, Nguyen Hue, picked his battle carefully along a stretch of the Mekong River near My Tho. He secretly arrayed his infantry along the northern shore of the river and on some islands in the middle facing the troops on the northern banks; then he placed his naval forces in hiding in two side streams on either side of the infantry positions. Next, he sent a small Tay Son flotilla to lure the Siamese naval forces into his ambush. The Siamese, confident of victory against what appeared to be a small Tay Son force, chased the ships along the Mekong and right into the trap that Nguyen Hue had laid. All of the Siamese ships were destroyed, and only 1,000 of the original troops survived to flee back to Siam via Cambodia. The loss was devastating for the Nguyen forces who fled back to Siam for refuge. The Nguyen cause had been further undermined by the Siamese land forces who had made themselves extremely unpopular with the local populations through their looting and pillaging as they travelled through the countryside. This had alienated many peasants who in turn offered their support to the Tay Son. Nguyen Anh realized the problem with the Siamese troops, and told his generals: "If we want to retake this country, then we must have the support of the people. If we gain Gia Dinh, but lose the hearts of the people, then I will not have the heart to succeed. It would be better to turn back the Siamese troops in order to prevent their making their people miserable." * The Tay Son turn their attention to the North (1786-1789) Meanwhile, the Tay Son were intent on expanding their influence in the north. Having decisively defeated the Nguyen forces in the south and chased them back to Siam, the Tay Son felt more secure in an effort to push their control northward. Two factors were instrumental in the northern campaigns. The first was the recent defection of Nguyen Huu Chinh, formerly an officer under the Trinh general, Hoang Ngu Phuc. Chinh was a man of great ambition relected in his nickname, "the Savage Eagle." He actively sought to stir up the Tay Son interest in going to the north, which he saw as a grand field in which to pursue his personal ambitions. The second was that the Trinh grip on power had been substantially weakened. Since 1773, series of famines and floods had forced many people to leave their villages in search of food. Secondly, the Trinh ruler, Trinh Sam, had grown increasingly depraved and disconnected from the realities of rule, and devoted his time and resources to festivals and palace construction. Furthermore, a rupture in the court had developed when Sam had made the young son of a favorite concubine, rather than his eldest son, his designated heir. Two factions emerged in the court supporting the two sides, further weakening the Trinh polity. Clearly, the time was ripe for attacking the north. Nguyen Nhac sent an expedition against Phu Xuan led by Nguyen Hue and Huu Chinh. Hue sent a naval force up the Gianh River to seize the fortifications and to prevent the arrival of additional reinforcements from the north. Moreover, as he crossed the Hai Van Pass with his infantry, his naval force benefitted from the rising tide which carried his boats to the walls of the citadel, allowing an attack simultaneously by land and sea. The city surrendered after a brief resistance, and all of the other areas quickly joined in submitting to the Tay Son. In a matter of days, all of Thuan Hoa, up to the Gianh River, had fallen into the hands of the Tay Son (by now it was June of 1786) Hue's orders from his brother had been to stop at the traditional frontier (that is, the Gianh River), but then, in a conversation recorded in the Hoang Le Nhat Thong Chi, Chinh convinced Hue to take advantage of circumstances to press the attack and seize the north. [see Khoi, p. 320] Hue and Chinh attacked northward, seizing granaries of rice along the rivers as they lead their flotilla of 400 ships. Chinh passed through Nghe An and Thanh Hoa without meeting any resistance. Meanwhile in the capital, the court was not greatly concerned about the news of the loss of Thuan Hoa, which after all, was only recently conquered territory; but, the fall of Nghe An and Thanh Hoa was more ominous. The Trinh blocked the river entrance to Son Nam, but Hue used a ruse to open it; he sent five ships to attack at night, and when the Trinh had used up their artillery ammunition, the Tay Son ships moved in and easily opened the route to Hanoi. Trinh Sam fled to Son Tay, but was captured and committed suicide, ending the long line of Trinh lords. This left the road to the capital wide upon, and the Tay Son marched into Thang Long on July 21, 1786. Once in the capital, Hue imposed strict discipline on his troops in the capital and also imposed summary justice in an effort to bring order to the streets. More importantly, he offered his submission to the Le King, Le Hien-tong, promising not to intervene in court affairs. He did, however, insist on a solemn audience with the Emperor on Sept. 7, 1786. -he arrived at the palace with numerous officers, and, after 5 ritual prostrations, presented to the king an army register and an inscription testifying that the Le dynasty had been restored to real power. -The Emperor, in return, gave him the title of general and the title Duke of Uy, and given him his daughter, Ngoc Han, in marriage. Several days later, the Emperor died, leaving the throne to his weak son, Le Chieu Thong. Meanwhile, Nguyen Nhac, jealous of Hue, came to the north himself, to have his own audience with the new Emperor, reiterating Tay Son support and promising good relations with the Le. Then, in the 8th lunar month, the Tay Son return to the south with their armies. Le Chieu Thong, was however a very poor leader, and easily manipulated by more powerful politicians. This prompted the remnants of the Trinh family to stage a small comeback, and they were able to reimpose their family's traditional influence over the court. The Emperor secretly communicated news of this situation to Nguyen Huu Chinh, the Tay Son general, and Chinh, seeing a great opportunity, arrived in the north at the head of a 10,000 man army, easily destroyed the Trinh troops, and established himself as the new master of the North. Hue, angered at Chinh's unauthorized actions ordered him to return, but Chinh refused. At this juncture, a dispute between the brothers leads them to formally divide their territory between them. Nguyen Lu is assigned to rule over the southern provinces, headquartered in Saigon. Nhac takes the central region for himself, and stations himself in the traditional Tay Son stronghold of Qui Nhon. Nguyen Hue, is assigned to rule the northern territory and his capital is at Phu Xuan. In the meantime, Nguyen Huu Chinh counsels Le Chieu Thong to demand the return of Nghe An from Nguyen Hue. Instead, Hue responded by ordering his aide, Vo Van Nham, to take a body of troops to Thang Long to seize the traitor, Chinh. Nham moved north, easily taking the capital, now abandoned by the Le, and captured and killed Chinh. But then, Nham was seduced by the same ambitions that stirred Nguyen Huu Chinh, and seeing no obstacles in his path, took power for himself. According to the Nguyen chronicles, Ngo Van So, the Tay Son general in the north despised Nham, and secretly sent a message to Hue stating that Nham was planning to betray him. Hue trusted Ngo Van So, and so he attacked Thang Long, capturing Nham. Nham protested that he had been unjustly accused by Ngo Van So, but Hue would not listen. Hue said: "It may be that in reality you are not guilty, but you frighten me, and therefore you ARE guilty." Then he killed him, and placed Ngo Van So in charge in his place. While all of this was going on, the defeated Le Emperor had fled north to China, where he appealed to the Chinese Qing Emperor for assistance in reclaiming his throne. He argued to the Chinese, that since Vietnam was technically a Chinese tributary state (it sent periodic tribute, ostensibly in acknowledgement of Chinese superiority), that the Chinese were obligated to defend Vietnam against aggressors. The Chinese clearly understood that the situation was more complex than that, for the aggression, if that was what it was, was internal, and not a foreign threat. Moreover, the Chinese approach to these sorts of situations tended to be more pragmatic than dogmatic. They had rejected similar appeals by earlier Vietnamese monarchs challenged by internal threats, even reaching accomodations with the "usurpers." These Chinese response would be one of self-interest. And the Chinese court concluded, based on the arguments of their provincial governor Ton Si Nghi, to support a Le-led invasion of Vietnam. As a result, in late October, 1788, the Chinese army crossed into Vietnam and seeing that they were outnumbered, the Tay Son forces, under Ngo Van So, retreated southward to Thanh Hoa, where they sent messages to Nguyen Hue, back in Phu Xuan for help. The Chinese then quickly reoccupied Thang Long without resistance and placed the Le ruler back on the throne. In the meantime, however, Quang Trung-Nguyen Hue (named himself Emperor in late 1787), had received the message of the invasion and proceded northward. On hearing that Nguyen Hue himself led the Tay Son forces, the Le Emperor fled from Thang Long. Nguyen Hue sent an envoy with a petition to Ton Si Nghi (Sun Shi Yi), requesting that he withdraw his troops. The Chinese general tore up the petition and killed the envoy. His arrogance would not long go unpunished. In fact, his biggest mistake had probably been to stop his troops in Thang Long in the first place. They had stopped to enthrone the Le Emperor and to celebrate the Chinese (lunar) New Year. As a result, the Chinese troops were busy celebrating the lunar New Year, with no thought to their impending danger. The Tay Son forces then timed their attack on Thang Long on midnight of the 5th day of the Tet (lunar New Year) celebration, catching the Chinese totally by surprise and the Chinese forces were easily destroyed as they fled in complete disarray. Recognizing the Tay Son strength, the Chinese were quick to be conciliatory and formally extend diplomatic recognition to the Tay Son rulers, provided that Nguyen Hue would himself travel to Beijing to be invested by the Chinese Emperor. Recognizing that leaving the country while the Nguyen still threatened in the north, never mind putting himself at the mercy of the Chinese, would be extremely risky, Quang Trung once again used a ruse. He found a nephew who bore a striking resemblence to himself, and sent him in his place. The Chinese were not aware of the fact that they were hosting an imposter, and treated him with all of the dignity reserved for visiting rulers. By ending the rule of the Le and gaining Chinese recognition of their legitimacy, the Tay Son set about trying to impose their own ideas on Vietnam's economy and society. Before continuing with the story of the conflict between the Tay Son and the Nguyen in the south, it would make sense to look briefly at the accomplishments of the Tay Son government: * The Tay Son Government (1789-1802) Military affairs 1) heavy emphasis on military preparedness: every person had to carry an ID card which made it easy to determine their military service obligation; those without ID cards were automatically enrolled in the army. 2) 1 out of 3 men between 18 and 55 was enrolled in the army and received rigorous training 3) Quang Trung allegedly had grand plans to retake the two southern Chinese provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong and also plans to invade Siam in retaliation for its assistance to Nguyen Anh. 4) government administration was organized along military lines; military mandarins were ranked above civil mandarins in the government hierarchy for the first time in Vietnam's long history. 5) focus on strengthening the armed forces with new weapons and warships Economics: 1) after all the warfare, a key problem was reconstructing a devastated agricultural base: many people had abandoned their fields and villages and production was very low. a) required people to return to their home villages. b) redistributed communal land to those returning to their villages c) imposed heavy taxes on village lands that were not brought back into cultivation after one year. d) after about three years, production levels appear to have risen to pre-war levels. 2) sought to stimulate both internal and foreign trade; a key consideration of the commercial interests that had supported the Tay Son from their earliest days. 3) actively encouraged trade with China across their mutual border, establishing several markets in the frontier areas of Cao Bang and Lang Son; as he wrote to the Chinese Emperor, he hoped that "frontiers would be opened and markets made free, so that goods could circulate in the interests of the people's consumption." Social/educational: 1) use of Nom, a use of Chinese-derived characters to write Vietnamese words, introduced for government documents and there is a plan to translate the Chinese classics into Nom; Quang Trung appoints Nguyen Thiep, a well-respected Confucian scholar, to head an academy whose goal is extensive translation projects in Nom as well as developing a new curriculum for further developing the Vietnamese language. 2) founded more schools at all levels and held examinations to fill government posts; 3) high degree of toleration for Catholic missionaries, despite some early Tay Son run-ins with churchs and Christian groups in the south, where they had been busy redistributing wealth. Conclusion: While Nguyen Hue and the Tay Son had implemented some limited reforms, particularly in the areas of education and commerce, they ultimately did not live up to the hopes of the peasant masses who had been the backbone of the movement. There was no massive land redistribution program and the burdens of taxation and land rents were only somewhat ameliorated. Furthermore, the problem of corrupt officials was one that also plagued the Tay Son administration and proved to be a source of friction that allowed the Nguyen to recruit peasant support in their effort to reconquer Viet Nam. Still, the Tay Son had the potential for a more fundamental transformation of Vietnamese society - a potential that was cut short by the unexpected death of Nguyen Hue in 1792, at the age of 40. * Nguyen Anh mounts a Comeback (1787-1802) After another two years in exile in Siam, Nguyen Anh, taking advantage of divisions within the Tay Son camp, decided to make an effort to recapture the southern province of Gia Dinh. This time, In 1787, his forces landed at Long Xuyen in the southern delta region and gradually advanced toward Saigon. They were nearly defeated by a Tay Son army led by Pham Van Tham, but another southern general joined sides with the Nguyen, allowing them to gain the victory. By August 1788 they were once again in control of Gia Dinh. At this point, Nguyen Anh made a more serious effort to consolidate his base in that region, and his efforts paid off. Gia Dinh was to remain in Nguyen hands continuously until the final defeat of the Tay Son. Participating with Nguyen Anh's army at this time was a small group of French mercenaries and several western ships. During his time in Siam, Anh had decided to seek assistance from western powers. He came into contact with the Bishop of Adran, Pigneau de Beahaine, and deputed him, along with Nguyen Anh's young son, Prince Canh, to travel to France to seek assistance from the French government. The two left Siam in 1784, and finally in 1787 had reached France where they were received by Louis XVI. The two sides reached an agreement, signed at Versailles, in November 1787. The terms: France provides: 1) 4 warships 2) 1,200 infantrymen 3) 200 artillery men 4) 250 African soldiers 5) ammunition
Viet Nam provides: 1) cede Hoi An and Pulau Condore 2) French trade monopoly in Southern Viet Nam 3) food, troops and supplies or transport when France needed them for wars in Asia. This agreement, however, was never carried out. The India-based French official assigned by the King to enact the treaty was given discretion to drop it if it seemed impractical, and that is exactly what he did. In any case, events in France less than 2 years later (ie. the Revolution) would have rendered the agreement moot anyway. As a result, de Behaine, was very frustrated and decided to take matters into his own hands. He recruited a group of French mercenaries, raised money to hire two ships and supplies and provided these to the Nguyen leader. Much has been made of French support to the Vietnamese effort to recapture their country and defeat the Tay Son. But the reality is that by the time this rather small contingent arrived in Vietnamese territory in 1789, Nguyen Anh had already retaken Gia Dinh and had spent nearly 2 years consolidating his grip on the territory. Furthermore, it would take the Nguyen more than a decade to finally defeat the Tay Son, hardly a testament to the advantages of having a handful of French troops. Also, it should be remembered, that the Vietnamese already had western firearms through much earlier contact with Western traders and actual weapons production in southern Vietnam, so the French supplies were hardly a critical factor either. Finally, the Tay Son brother defending the region of Gia Dinh, Nguyen Lu, was the least able of the three brothers, and he had quickly fled back to Qui Nhon at the onset of the Nguyen offensive, leaving the defense of the territory in the hands of his generals. Having consolidated his grasp on the extreme south, Nguyen Anh embarked on a series of campaigns toward the Tay Son positions in the north. By 1790, Nguyen Anh had pushed his control northward , taking the cities of Phan Ri and Binh Thuan. Then, in 1792, he inaugurated what became known as the "Monsoon War," in which he would coordinate his attacks with the coming of the monsoon season. He would launch a coordinated land and sea attack to the north, striking at several Tay Son positions, before pulling back, without occupying any of the territory. The main objective of the Nguyen attacks was the city of Qui Nhon, which was the capital of the Tay Son territories in the center and was under the control of Nguyen Nhac. In 1793, the Nguyen attacks eventually forced Nguyen Nhac to appeal for assistance to Nguyen Hue's young son, Quang Toan, who was in control of the northern territories. Toan's superior troops and generals came to Nhac's assistance and were able to lift the Nguyen siege, pushing Nguyen Anh all the way back to Gia Dinh; the appeal for assistance had cost Nhac control of Qui Nhon, however, and he was forced to turn control of the city over to the northern general, Pham Cong Hung. Nhac died that same year, allegedly of sheer anger at the loss of control over his domain. The Nguyen, undeterred by their repeated failures to take Qui Nhon, launched further assaults on that city in 1797 and 1799, and this last attack was finally successful in dislodging the Tay Son forces. Nguyen Anh, himself, however, withdrew from the city, leaving it in the hands of his generals - Vo Tanh and Ngo Tung Chau; and in February of 1800, two Tay Son generals, Trang Quang Dieu and Vo Van Dung again attacked the city and it appeared that the Nguyen forces would have to surrender the city to the Tay Son once again. Rather than doing this, the Nguyen general, Vo Tanh, suggested to Nguyen Anh, that he attack Phu Xuan while the Tay Son forces were largely concentrated for the assault on Qui Nhon. The Nguyen took the Tay Son capital at Phu Xuan, and a Tay Son effort to drive back the Nguyen was itself forced to retreat. However, the Tay Son general, Trang Quang Dieu, now turned all of his attention back to taking Qui Nhon which they did. The battles continued to see-saw with the outcome of the war still far from clear. A Tay Son offensive in early 1802 was rebuffed and its leading generals were forced to withdraw. Finally, in June 1802, Nguyen Anh proclaimed himself the new Emperor, Gia Long, and embarked on a final campaign to capture and eliminate the remaining Tay Son leaders. These were captured and badly treated before being executed in gruesome form. The Tay Son era had come to an end, and the Nguyen, Viet Nam's last dynasty came to power, and was to remain, at least nominally in charge of Viet Nam until the transfer of authority from Bao Dai to the Viet Minh in August of 1945.
Chronology of the Tay Son Period
1771 Nguyen Nhac flees to the hills with his brother on charges of misappropriating the tax revenues he was to collect 1773 The Tay Son seize the coastal town Qui Nhon, when Nhac, pretending to be captured in cage, frees himself at night to open the gates to the Tay Son forces. The Tay Son troops enter the city, massacre the Nguyen soldiers, and gain control of the city. The Tay Son capture the cities of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai 1774 Nov. - the Trinh troops led by Hoang Ngu Phuc reach Thanh Hoa Lunar 10th month (Nov. 4- Dec. 2) - Trinh armies cross the Gianh River, the traditional border between the Trinh and Nguyen territories. 1775 Trinh forces take Quang Nam after defeating the Tay Son troops; Summer - Nhac requests an alliance with Trinh who agree and give Nhac titles and regalia. Winter, Hoang Ngu Phuc's army withdraws from Quang Nam (marking the farthest southward advance of the Trinh), to Phu Xuan
1776 North · Feb/March, disease-ridden Trinh retreat from Phu Xuan to Thuan Hoa · HNP dies in bed at age 64; is replaced by Bui The Dat · 8th month; Bui The Dat and Le Qui Don are recalled and Pham Ngo Cau is named the new governor of Thuan Hoa South ·early in the year, Tay Son attack north toward Phu Xuan forces Due Tong to flee to Cochinchina; names Nguyen Phuc Duong as crown prince to stay and fight in Phu Xuan ·Nguyen Lu takes Saigon through a naval attack on Gia Dinh; ·The Nguyen retake it and Lu is forced to return to Qui Nhon ·Nhac decides to build a walled capital at the site of the ancient Cham capital at Do Ban (south of Da Nang?) ·Nguyen partisans, led by Do Thanh Nhan, create the Dong Son army ·5th month (June-July 1776) DTN retakes Saigon. ·late in the year, crown prince Vuong (being held by Nhac) flees by sea to CCC.
1777 early in the year Trinh acquiesce to his demands, and appoint Nhac governor of Quang Nam ·(3rd month; April-May) Nhac sends Lu and Hue to retake Saigon and they do, apparently killing prince Duong ·Vuong and his nephew Dong commit suicide; Nguyen Anh now formally takes over at headof Nguyen forces ·Lu and Hue return to Quang Nam, leaving their officers in charge in Saigon
1778 ·[Jan-Feb] Nguyen general Do Thanh Nhan recaptures Saigon ·Nhac proclaims himself Emperor, inaugurating the Thai Duc reign era ·Nhac sends another army to attack southward, but the Nguyen enjoy a series of victories that threaten even Quang Nam 1779 ·Spring, the Tay Son recapture Can Gio, and the Nguyen troops are forced out of Saigon again; ·the Nguyen retreat to Tam Phu, assemble a 5,000 man army and counter-attack; the Dong Son army attacks at night and achieve surprise and a victory; ·the Dong Son go on to retake Saigon, they then find Nguyen Anh (who was on the sidelines during all of this) and bring him back to the city. 1780 ·Nguyen Anh, nephew of the king,proclaims himself king. ·Anh, fearing Do Than Nhan's ability and military power, has him killed, and then woos the Dong Son army to his cause;
1782 ·[May] Nhac and Hue attack Can Gio; they then drive Nguyen Anh out of Saigon, where they burn and pillage the businesses of ethnic Chinese and kill more than 10,000 Chinese [three theories: Le Thanh Khoi - break their commercial monopoly; Phan Huy Le, revenge on ethnic Chinese for the treason of Ly Tai who had gone over to the Nguyen side; Dai Nam Thuc Luc - revenge for Chinese troops who killed one of Nhac's favorite generals] Nguyen Anh is driven out of Gia Dinh and seeks refuge on the island of Phu Quoc; Nhac and Hue return to Qui Nhon ·Nguyen forces, led by Chu Van Tiep recapture Saigon, Nguyen Anh returns
1783 ·Lu and Hue attack again, driving Nguyen Anh back to Phu Quoc; a pursuing Tay Son fleet is destroyed in a storm, but Nguyen Anh manages to flee to Siam;
1785 ·Tay Son fleet destroys a joint Nguyen-Siamese force at the huge battle of Rach Gam-Xoai Mut; this sets back Nguyen efforts to retake southern VN by several years, and the Tay Son turn their attention to the north.
1786 ·Tay Son forces begin their attack on the Trinh to the north; ·divisions appear to emerge between the Tay Son brothers, as Nhac resents Hue's ability and following; a short conflict between them is resolved, but not before it apparently gives new hope to the Nguyen.
1787 ·Nguyen Hue declares himself Emperor Quang Trung in Phu Xuan, and heads north again.
1789 ·Chinese invasion force of 200,000 troops marches unopposed into Hanoi, as the Tay Son have engaged in a strategic retreat; during the lunar New Year celebration, the Tay Son forces fall on the Chinese, totally destroying them and taking the capital on the 6th day of the lunar New Year.
1792 ·Quang Trung plans to open the Sung Chinh Library of Nom texts; he is suddenly taken ill, and dies in September. 1793 The "monsoon wars" begin, in which Nguyen Anh uses the prevailing monsoon winds to launch repeated, and repeatedly unsuccessful, attacks on the Tay Son stronghold at Qui Nhon. 1794 There is a shakeup in the Tay Son government, as an effort is made to oust the regent, Bui Dac Tuyen. The coup is successful in ousting Tuyen, who was seen as a danger to the stability of the regime. The coup however did little to stem the slow decline of the Tay Son polity, and this period was the melting away of some key Tay Son supporters, including Nguyen Thiep. 1799 The Nguyen are finally successful in seizing Qui Nhon, and forcing the Tay Son troops to retreat north toward Phu Xuan; the Tay Son soon counter-attack, and the Nguyen are beseiged in the citadel. 1800 The Nguyen decide to surrender Qui Nhon, and to concentrate their efforts on the by now relatively lightly guarded Tay Son capital at Phu Xuan. This falls to the Nguyen dividing the Tay Son armies. 1801 Nguyen Anh initiates his final campaign against the Tay Son; the Tay Son are forced to flee northward, in an attempt to hold out in Hanoi 1802 Nguyen Anh finally captures Thang Long in June; he then orders the public flogging of some key Tay Son supporters, including Ngo Thi Nham. Nham is beaten at the Temple of Literature in Hanoi, and dies shortly thereafter of his wounds. Biographical sketches of some of the most important figures in the Tay Son movement: [I hope to also post a listing that includes other historical figures of this period, including members of the Nguyen anti-Tay Son forces, key Europeans and other important 18th century figures.] The Tay Son Brothers: Three brothers from the small village of Tay Son (Western Mountains), which is inland from the important coastal city of Qui Nhon: Nguyen Nhac: the eldest, born in 1743; he was a minor tax collector and part- time betel nut trader, who had extensive contacts in the highland regions because of his itinerant occupations. This was to be significant when he went into rebellion, as the highland region and its population were the key to the early consolidation and success of the movement. Nguyen Hue: the middle brother, born in 1753; he was only 18 when the rebellion broke out, but he quickly established himself as a military genius. He was a master tactician and his armies were virtually invincible. He established himself as the main military and political leader of the movement, and while he and his brothers were to subsequently hold parallel positions as rulers of three separate regions of the country, he was clearly the paramount leader. On his death in July of 1792 (?) the fate of the Tay Son was probably sealed. Nguyen Lu: the youngest, born in 1754; there is some discussion that he was at one time a Buddhist monk; Nguyen Lu is one of the most enigmatic figures in the movement and his abilities and contributions are far from clear. He was usually dispatched in tandem with Nguyen Hue on missions to attack the Nguyen forces to the south. Unlike his brothers, he did not even merit a biography in the Dai Nam Liet Truyen, the official Nguyen court biographies. His death is described in some detail in the missionary letters (title here).
Their Followers: The Tay Son brothers would not have been able to achieve their successes without the assistance of many talented military and civilian supporters. These men and a few women were among the most talented of their generation, and many had passed the highest level of the civil service examinations.These figures joined the movement at different times, but the majority began to lend their support after the first Tay Son invasion of the north in 1786. Ngo Thi Nham (1746-1803) - the son of Ngo Thì Si, a respected and honest northern official. Nham was involved in political turmoil and factional strife in the north and had to flee the capitol several times; he eagerly joined the Tay Son in 1788 becoming perhaps Nguyen Hue's closest advisor; he was captured in 1802, publicly flogged and died shortly thereafter. He was the author of many of the Tay Son's most important edicts, and these have been collected in the work, ???? Phan Huy Ich (1751-1822) - joined Tay Son in 1788; he served on a number of Tay Son embassies to China; like Ngo Thi Nham, he was loyal to the end and was captured by Nguyen Anh in 1802. Ich was then pardoned and returned home where he taught until his death; he is the author of important collections of poems Nguyen Huu Chinh (?-1787) - a key military general, he reached a high position in the Trinh military, serving loyally under Hoang Ngu Phuc until Phuc's death. When Phuc died, Chinh became the victim of factional political skirmishes, and fled to the Tay Son held territories and joined their forces in 1782. He became Nguyen Hue's close advisor and a key Tay Son military leader. According to some accounts, it was Chinh who convinced Hue to invade the north in 1786. Chinh led the naval forces in that campaign which easily defeated the Trinh. After that Chinh was left in the north to oversee the government and provide assistance to the Le Emperor, but when the Trinh tried to reassert their authority and the Le Emperor summoned Chinh for assistance, Chinh used the opportunity to seize power for himself. He was then killed by the Tay Son, when Nguyen Hue led forces back north in 1787. Nguyen Thiep (1723-1804) - a respected scholar from Nghe An, he had served as an educational officer and administrator in the Le government, but went into retirement as the decline of the Le became more and more apparent in the mid- 18th century. His reputation attracted Nguyen Hue who consulted Thiep for advice prior to routing the Chinese in late1788- early 1789. Thiep had initially been reluctant to associate himself with Hue, but eventually overcame his misgivings. He later agreed to head the Vien Sung Chinh (Institute for Political Studies), where he oversaw a major project to translate and publish the Confucian classics into Chu Nom - the Vietnamese vernacular script. This project was unfortunately never completed, in large part because on Nguyen Hue's death in 1792, Thiep returned to his life of seclusion. He wrote numerous poems, and his extensive correspondence with Nguyen Hue has been preserved in the Lap Phong Van Cao. Bui Duong Lich (1757-1828) - another Le official who joined the Tay Son after 1787, albeit reluctantly. His attitudes towards the Tay Son, and his continued loyalty to the Le, even in their declining years, are revealed in his Le Quy Dat Su. He is also well known as the author of the Nghe An Ky. Ngo Van So (? - 1794) - a key Tay Son official, So probably joined the Tay Son sometime in 1786, and took part in the 1787 campaign to oust Nguyen Huu Chinh. In 1788 he was placed in charge of all political and military affairs in the north, a place he held until his death in 1794. He was instrumental along with Ngo Thi Nham, in arranging the Tay Son's strategic retreat in the face of the Chinese invasion of late 1788. He later helped break the Nguyen seige of Qui Nhon in 1793. In 1794, he became embroiled in Tran Van Ky's plot to oust Bui Dac Tuyen, who was acting as regent for the young Emperor. So was apparently viewed as part of Bui Dac Tuyen's faction, and so was arrested and executed by drowning. Tran Van Ky (? - 1802) - an important Tay Son official, and close confidant of Nguyen Hue. He is an interesting figure because he passed the Nguyen exams at Phu Xuan in 1774 (first on the list), and then in 1775, after the Trinh invasion, he went to Thang Long to take the National Examinations. He was back in Phu Xuan (?), when Nguyen Hue, hearing his reputation, summoned him, and Ky quickly agreed to join the Tay Son. He was a useful assistant to Hue in the 1786 campaign to the north, since he was familiar with the capital from his sojourn there in the 1770s. Ky served Hue by introducing Hue to some of the most prominent Northern intellectuals who would become instrumental in Tay Son rule. These included Ngo Thi Nham, and Phan Huy Ich. He later also played an important role as intermediary between Nguyen Hue and the scholar Nguyen Thiep. In 1802 he was invited by Gia Long to join the new Nguyen government, but proudly declined. He was ordered executed, but avoided this fate by committing suicide on a last trip to visit his ancestral altars.
Manifesto of Quang Trung, King of Upper Cochinchina and Tonkin, to all of the mandarins, soldiers and people of the provinces of Quang Ngai and Qui Nhon: "You all, great and small, for more than 15 years have not ceased to subsist by the kindness of our family. It is true that during all of this time, while we won victories in the north and in the south, we recognized that we had developed an attachment to these two provinces. This is where we have found courageous men and mandarins capable of forming our court. Everywhere we have carried our arms our enemies have been defeated and they have been dispersed everywhere that we have achieved our conquests. The Siamese and the cruel Chinese have been forced to bear the yoke... As for the remaining impurities in the court, after more than 30 years have you ever seen them do anything for the good? In the one hundred battles that we have brought to them, their soldiers have been dispersed and their generals put to death. The province of Gia Dinh is full of their bones. You have been witness to that which I have told you, and if you have not seen it with your own eyes then at least you have heard it with your ears. What case can be made for this miserable Chung [Nguyen Anh], who has fled into the evil Kingdoms of Europe, or of the timid people of Gia Dinh, who dare to make themselves into a movement and raise an army, why do you fear them so? Why are your hearts seized with fear? If their army of the ground and of the sea were to present itself in front of all our ports, and they were seized in a time during which you were unable to wait for more, the Grand Emperor will make you aware of the reasons by letters, and you will see that the mandarins, the soldiers, and all of you, in these two provinces, do not have the courage for battle, and it is for this reason, rather than their taltents that they have taken all of the places at present in their possession. Your land army has fled from his coast, and that of the sea has fled from his. Now, by the order of our brother, the Emperor, we are preparing our own formidable army by land and sea, and we will reduce the enemy of our name with the same ease that one might crumple a piece of rotten or dry wood. If all of you do not make a single case with the enemy, do not fear anything, but only open your eyes and ears to see and to understand that which we do. You know that the provinces of Binh Khang and of Nha Trang, which are nothing by fragments of the body of Gia Dinh, that the province of Phu-Yen, which has always been at the center of the war, and finally the province of Binh-Thuan, up to Cambodia, will all by a single blow return to being under our power, and at last the whole world will know that we are truly brothers, and that we have never forgotten that we are of the same blood. We exhort all of you, great and small, who are sustained by the family of the Emperor, to remain loyally attached to him, and mark that our army will purify the province of Gia Dinh, and will assert our authority. The names of your two provinces will be made immortal in our annals. Do not be so credulous as to give your faith to what the Europeans say. What sorts of skills does this species of men have? They all have the eyes of green serpents, and we cannot regard them but as floating cadavers, which have been thrown here by the seas of the north.... [who] have come here speaking of vessels of copper and of balloons [ie. hot air balloons, of which one was demonstrateed in Cochinchina by a Frenchman around this time]. All of the villages that find themselves along the roads of these two provinces are to take care to build bridges in order to facilitate the movement of our troops. As soon as you receive this order, you should make haste to conform to it. Receive this manifesto with respect. The 10th day of the 7th (lunar) month of the 5th year of Quang Trung [July 1792] Note: This is my preliminary translation of a French version of this edict found in the Nouvelles Lettres Edifiantes, Vol. VII, pp. 225-228. [The paragraphs are arbitrary divisions to render the text more readable]
Quang Trung's Speech to his troops before the campaign to resist the Chinese invasion (December 1788) The Ch'ing have invaded our country, they are occupying Thang long (ancient name of Hanoi), the capital. Are you not aware of the situation? In the universe, each constellation is assigned a specific place and, on earth, each country has its own government. The Chinese do not belong to our racial stock, therefore their intentions must be completely different from ours. From the Han dynasty to the present day, how many times have they not raided our country, massacred our population, emptied our treasuries? No one in our country could bear this humiliation, and everyone wished to drive the enemy beyond our borders. Under the Han, there were the Trung queens. Under the Sung there were Dinh Tien Hoang and Le Dai Hanh. Under the Yuan, there was Tran Hung Dao. Under the Ming there was Le Thai To, the founder of the present dynasty. These heroes could not sit silently and watch the enemy indulge in violence and cruelty toward the people. They had to comply with the aspirations of the people and raise the banner of justice. A single battle was often sufficient to overcome the Chinese and push them back into their own country. Throughout all of these periods, the South [Vietnam] and the North [China] were clearly separated. There were no incidents along the frontier areas while successive dynasties enjoyed long lives. Since the Dinh dynasty [968-980] we no longer suffer as we did before when we were subject to Chinese domination.Is this an advantage or an inconvenience. a success or a failure? I let you be the judges of the situation, but the examples of previous dynasties provide an obvious pattern of conduct. Today the Ch'ing have returned once again. They are determined to annex our country and to divide it into provinces and districts. How can they not be aware of what has happened to the Sung, the Ming and the Yuan? For this reason I am assuming the leadership of the army to expel them. All of you are in complete possession of your intelligence and your capacities. Therefore you should help me achieve this great undertaking. Should you maintain your old vice of having two hearts, I shall immediately exterminate all of you without exception. Let this be a warning to all of you. Notes: This translation is by Prof. Truong Buu Lam, who graciously permitted me to reproduce it here. [The original text is in Chinese, but a Vietnamese version can be found in the Hoang Le Nhat Thong chi. See for example the 1958 Saigon edition, pp. 254-255.] Some Resources for Studying the Tay Son As I mentioned above, there is very little detailed information on the Tay Son available in western languages: I have, however, compiled a short western- language bibliography, which provides a bit more information, and might be a reasonable starting point for finding more detailed material. The thing to keep in mind is that most of these works include perhaps only a chapter, or sometimes a few pages on the Tay Son. Some of these books are not directly about the Tay Son, but deal with issues of 18th century Vietnamese history that help to explain the context of the uprising. [nb: some of these books may not be readily available in your local or even university library. They are not particularly obscure, however, and should be accessible through inter-library loans if necessary].
For those who read Vietnamese, there are a great number of sources available. While the original texts are in Classical Chinese, most of the important works have been translated into modern Vietnamese. The one caveat is that the vocabulary for these texts in "modern Vietnamese" is probably quite different from that of contemporary spoken Vietnamese. Thus even if you speak or read everyday Vietnamese, these texts will probably require that you have a good dictionary at your side, and preferably one that includes so-called Sino- Vietnamese words, as well as other words or expressions that are today considered archaic.[Recommended Dictionaries and Glossaries] I have been working with these texts for almost five years and I still routinely come across words or phrases in quoc ngu that I cannot adequately translate or explain. Please click here for a preliminary Vietnamese and Classical Chinese bibliography.
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